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Religion, Theology and Film in a Postmodern Age: A Response to John
Lyden
Abstract
This paper engages in a critical, creative conversation with John Lyden's article in JR & F 1.2. Though affirming
the basic tenor of Lyden's approach, this paper presses Lyden to consider that a "commending and critiquing"
approach to the task of film interpretation requires greater attention to the ideological basis upon which such a
stance is possible. In particular, the theological particularity of discrete religious traditions has to be respected
by the scholar of religion. This respect must be shown despite all the attendant institutional complexities
which accompany it. The consequences of this need for religious interpreters of film to be more aware of, and
consciously working from, the particular hermeneutical (including theological) traditions within which they
themselves stand are then drawn out in relation to two films: Shirley Valentine and The Shawshank Redemption.
This article is available in Journal of Religion & Film: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol2/iss1/3
John Lyden's article "To Commend or To Critique? The Question of 
Religion and Film Studies" (JR & F Vol.1 No.2) helpfully delineates what is 
actually happening when films are examined and interpreted by scholars in the field 
of religious studies. His analysis of the inevitably dual response (at once positive 
and negative) made by the religious interpreter to the ambiguous (simul iustus et 
peccator) artistic product under scrutiny both highlights the complexity of the 
interpretative process and foregrounds the need to clarify what role any "religious 
response" to film can play in the public realm, and how this is to be done. Lyden 
shows, via an appropriation of the category of "myth", that religious studies must 
enable affirmation as well as negative judgment of values presented - explicitly or 
implicitly - within film.  
In this reply, I wish to affirm Lyden's basically strategy. I shall begin by 
relating his approach to my own mapping exercise, undertaken more explicitly from 
within theological studies, drawing out the clear points of similarity. I shall, 
however, then go on to raise critical questions about a number of aspects of Lyden's 
theoretical framework. In particular I shall draw attention to Lyden's understanding 
of "ideology", the implications of his use of such terms as "spiritual significance", 
"mythological core of religion" and "windows to transcendence", and the irony of 
his appeal to Lutheran theology. In a final section I shall draw out the consequences 
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of my critique for the task of the religious/theological interpretation of film with 
respect to two examples: Shirley Valentine and The Shawshank Redemption.  
In chapter 2 of Explorations in Theology and Film I seek to spell out the 
possible understandings of theology within which a critical appropriation of the 
subject-matter of film can take place.1 In making adaptive use of H. Richard 
Niebuhr's well-known taxonomy of five possible understandings of the relationship 
between "Christ" and "culture" I note that there are basically three stances which a 
theological interpreter can take up in relation to film. S/he can view the relationship 
between the task of theological construction and the interpretation of film as one of 
polar opposites: film simply cannot deliver to theology any of its resource-material 
("theology against culture"). Alternatively, s/he can shelve, or abandon, any appeal 
to a specific religious identity and argue for an understanding of theology which 
sees itself as so embedded in culture, that it is difficult to distinguish theological 
discourse from any other form of human discourse ("theology immersed in 
culture"). As a third possible option, s/he can accept the need for an identifiable 
(and particular) religious discourse and community/communities within which to 
work, and work dialectically with culture ("theology in critical dialog with 
culture"). Each of these three positions has had - and has - its supporters. Each is 
tenable. Clearly, only two of these - the second and third options - are going to be 
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of much practical use to people who believe that film has something to offer 
theological discussion. 
If my reading of Lyden's paper in the light of my own mapping exercise is 
correct, then we are in similar territory. "Theology against culture" correlates with 
his "critiquing" of film. Here it is striking how Lyden's description of supporters of 
this position from within religious studies ("…more common among scholars of 
religion. Drawing on liberationist and feminist critiques of hegemonic 
discourse…"; p4) shows what strange alliances can be formed, given that it would 
be within this same camp that fundamentalists and conservatives in Christianity 
would wish to be located. Lyden's highlighting of those who "commend" film 
relates most readily to those who view theology as "immersed in culture". The task 
is thus to see the "religious", the "mythical" (even "the collective unconscious"), 
below, beneath or behind film, beyond the constraints of any particular form of 
religiosity. 
Lyden effectively provides a third way - beyond commending and critiquing 
- and this is, I suggest, directly related in principle to a view of the relationship 
between theology and film as theology and film in critical dialog: theologians (as 
religious interpreters, in Lyden's reading) neither condemn nor affirm, they both 
commend and critique, depending on the results of a creative conversation between 
the material they bring to a film, and the material that a film presents to them. Given 
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my own mapping exercise, then, I cannot but affirm Lyden's "third way". This 
seems exactly what does happen - at its best - in the relationship between theology, 
or religious studies, and film. 
My critical interaction with Lyden's work, however, begins precisely at that 
point where we explore the significance of the alternative offered in my previous 
sentence: "theology, or religious studies". My argument, in a nutshell, is this: for 
Lyden to take up the position he has, requires that he be more explicit than he has 
been, about the value-system he inhabits, out of which he is able to undertake the 
task of "commending" and "critiquing". He need not, of course, explicitly take up 
a "theological" position in order to commend or critique the content of a film. But 
- as he seems to recognise at one point in his paper - it will inevitably be an 
ideological position of some form that he adopts.2 If I myself - as I indeed would - 
choose to commend a particularly Christian theological framework as a most 
suitable discussion-partner for the kind of things which films deal with, then I do 
so out of preference. But I do so also because I believe that such a discussion is 
likely to be especially fruitful in the exploration of film. My contention, then, is 
that Lyden's position requires greater attention to the particularity/ies (re. ideology, 
location, community/ies) implied in the dialogical approach to film he adopts. 
Though there is a correlation, then, between Lyden's third approach and my own 
preference for theology in critical dialog with film, my exploration suggests that 
4
Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 2 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol2/iss1/3
without more attention to the particularity of the theology/ideology out of which he 
speaks, Lyden's "third way" effectively leaves him more embedded in culture than 
he may care to admit (and thus a proponent of my second model ("theology 
immersed in culture"). In the rest of this article I shall spell out further how and 
why this lack of attention to religious particularity is a weakness in Lyden's paper, 
and what, therefore, is to be done about it. 
I begin with the terms "ideology" and "ideological". At a number of points 
in Lyden's article, it is clear that ideology is a bad thing. Take, for example, this 
statement: 
"Drawing on liberationist and feminist critiques of hegemonic discourse, 
religious scholars trained in these approaches have viewed popular 
American films as a prime example of that which secures and perpetuates 
ideology in America." (p4) 
Lyden may, of course, claim that at this point he is passing on a use of the term 
"ideology" as found in those he is commenting upon. But he does not seem to balk 
at this use of the term. Indeed throughout his commentary on the "critiquing" mode 
of discussion about film amongst scholars of religion, he appears to accept the view 
that where ideology is present, it is none-too-welcome. Where mythology functions 
as ideology, it is bad news. Ideologies will always, it seems, support hegemonic 
structures. And Lyden continues to use the term in this way when expounding his 
own "third way" of looking at film from a religious scholar's perspective. His 
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appropriation of the term "myth" in relation to film entails seeing film as a "good 
thing" when viewed as myth, but a "bad thing" when seen as ideology or as 
contributing to ideology (p7).  
Now there is a problem here. Whether or not an Althusserian understanding 
of the term "ideology" is adopted, it is worth noting that the words mythology and 
ideology as used by Lyden simply denote, in the former case, values, views or 
principles which are to be recommended, and in the latter those to be opposed or 
rejected. What we have not yet begun to ask is the basis upon which such judgments 
can be made. A Lutheran theological basis is found for an argument for film as 
ambiguous, but irreducible (and rich) myth-like narrative. But we have not yet 
found a means of distinguishing myth from ideology in the sense of knowing that 
which is worth keeping and promoting, and that which is not. Yet that, surely, is 
the true demand placed upon a scholar of religion in light of their public 
responsibility. And if it be true that we now live in a postmodern age, and the term 
means anything, it signifies that we must be more conscious than ever of the 
interpretative communities out of which we speak. Not only that, we must 
consciously use our participation in those communities as the basis upon which we 
can undertake interpretation at all. Only in that way, ironically, will we always be 
able check (via the challenge of others) the wisdom - or not - of what we say and 
believe. 
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It is at this point, I must admit, that I cannot see any other way forward for 
a scholar of religion than to dabble in theology. Or - if that is not a welcome word 
- I cannot see any other way forward than to attend to the competing truth-claims 
of different religious traditions (in whatever way they wish to be understood), 
knowing that religions can only be handled in all their complex particularity.3 I 
warm here to John Lyden's comparison of religion/film discussions with 
developments in inter-faith dialogue (p2). But the comparison need not be taken 
only in the direction suggested by Lyden. For unless it be claimed that scholars of 
religion - or religious believers (with no need, even, to specify which particular 
religion) - are somehow able to transcend the concreteness of religious particularity 
and the detail of human living, it is necessary to attend to the specifics of what 
religions (in all their internal diversity, as well as difference from each other) 
actually claim and promote. What particular religions (or theological, mystical, 
spiritual or ethical traditions within those traditions) claim and promote is what 
scholars of religion bring with them to their task of interpreting film. They can only 
know so much. And they can only support so much. They may not simply support 
a single tradition (it would probably be dangerous if they did). But they cannot 
support all. And the claim to be bound by no tradition is merely indicative of a lack 
of self-awareness, or a sign of a disturbing kind of individualism; probably both. 
Lyden is by no means saying this! But he does not carry through his awareness that 
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value-judgments can never be bracketed into the theological/ideological 
implications of his method. 
It is this lack of attention to religious particularity which makes me uneasy 
when I see reference to such terms as "spiritual significance", "windows to 
transcendence", the "mythological core of religion" or even "the religious 
interpreter of film", and this constitutes my second critical point. All of these terms 
- and Lyden is far from alone in using them, of course - end up carrying too much 
freight. It is clear that religions seem roughly to be in the same game, or a similar 
business. It makes sense to talk about "transcendence" as something which all 
religions are trying to deal with. "Spirituality" is something which some religions 
feel more comfortable with than others, but it is fairly clear that there is a dimension 
across the diversity of human experiences which can be included under this heading 
(even if reducible to no single thing). However, there is an ever-present danger of 
implying a false unity here.4 The task of interpreting film - even for scholars of 
religion (in religious studies departments, rather than in seminaries) - cannot merely 
be about identifying and working with religious images, universal symbols or 
signals of transcendence. Film interpretation - and the religious "use" of film - 
draws on particular religious and theological traditions in order to do its work. 
Unlike a seminary professor, a religious studies lecturer is likely to draw the 
religious net more widely in search of resource material to inform a creative 
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discussion with a film, and maybe with a different intent. But the conversation 
remains a matter of bringing particular, religious/theological traditions to a given 
film. Spreading the net more widely does not, of course, make any conclusion more 
profound or far-reaching. It may make it more diffuse and unhelpful. And the very 
location and practice of such a broad interpretative undertaking may imply a 
capacity on the part of the religious studies professor to conduct an overview, and 
stand in judgment, on the narrowness of a particular religious perspective. But as 
we are all postmodernists now, we know that such a Promethean standpoint is not 
possible. 
The approach which Lyden adopts, then, does insufficient justice, in my 
view, to the particularity of traditions which any "religious" interpretation of film 
must call upon in order to do its work. The implicit understanding of "religion" 
which pervades his paper must be challenged, not by an over-assertive form of 
orthodoxy clamouring for attention only to one religious tradition over all others, 
nor by a claim that university departments are simply not the best places to have 
discussions about religion and film (though that may well be true!). It must be 
challenged by the recognition that "religion" like "myth" is not reducible and exists 
only in particular, exasperatingly concrete and diverse forms. Just as there is no 
metanarrative, or monomyth; so there is also no "religious" reading as such of any 
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film, for there is no "religion" in relation to which such a reading can be 
constructed. 
This brings me to a brief, third and final point in my critique of John Lyden's 
paper: the irony of his appeal to his own Lutheran background in the provision of a 
rationale for his approach to film. This appeal illustrates my point precisely: in 
order to undertake the task of religious interpretation we have to draw on very 
particular traditions. Though it may be claimed that religious readings pick and 
choose from a wide range of available options, we are nevertheless confronted with 
the possibility (I think I'd say probability, but that would take time to argue) that 
the most fruitful dialogue with film will emerge from sustained conversation largely 
undertaken from within a single - but diverse - tradition which the interpreter knows 
well, in all its complex diversity. Buddhist, Christian and Jewish readings, for 
example, (and conversations between those interpretations - but not from any 
conclusive, overarching perspective) would be preferable to religious readings of 
film. At least then the theological ideologies are out in the open, and are being 
examined at the point at which they interact with the commended or critiqued 
ideologies of the films being interpreted. 
Where does my reaction to John Lyden's paper lead, then, and what does it 
mean for the task of the interpretation of film by scholars of religion? Let me 
summarize my challenge to John Lyden's position, before offering a couple of 
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examples. Lyden needs to supplement his thesis, it seems to me, with an 
understanding of theological discourse which, whilst leaving room for the complex 
dialogical discussion with film which he notes is in practice happening and also 
advocates, also acknowledges that religion only exists in specific forms. The 
particularity of religions means that all "religious" and "theological" discussion - 
no matter how broadly or loftily such discussions are conceived - happens in 
relation to specific theologies (or philosophies or ideologies). This does not then 
mean that religions or theologies in their particularity are not then open to critique; 
far from it. But it does highlight the difficulty of engaging in such critique, and 
indicates the level of stubbornness with which religious and theological views are 
likely to be upheld. If Lyden is uncomfortable with a reference to "theological 
discourse", as his paper implies might be the case, then I would defend its 
appropriateness at least on ideological grounds: most religions entail explicit 
theologies, whether we agree with their content or not, and we have to find a way 
of dealing with God-language by some means, without simply ignoring it or 
abandoning it.5 It is perhaps this hesitation in so much religious interpretation of 
film which has prevented maximum theological creativity.6 
But what do these insights mean for the task of interpreting film? In closing 
I take up two concrete examples. I have used the film Shirley Valentine in teaching 
- in formal and informal educational settings - over many years. Part of the 
11
Marsh: Religion, Theology and Film in a Postmodern Age
Published by DigitalCommons@UNO, 1998
attraction of the film, aside from the sheer impact it can have on viewers (and 
despite its apparent "lightness"), is its glaringly untheological character. It is not 
the kind of film you would expect to have a theological conversation with. Since 
putting down on paper one particular theological conversation with the film, my 
discussions with others have prompted so much more thinking.7 I would now want 
to accentuate much more the film's "chasms of unexplored implication".8 In 
particular, I would want to make more of the film's individualism, its lack of closer 
examination of the social structures within which Shirley Valentine operated, and 
also the failure to expose the explicit religious dimensions at least to Shirley's 
upbringing, and possibly even to her experience in middle-age. From a cultural 
studies perspective, then, it would easily be possible to locate this film (though 
made in the late 80s) within a philosophical mood of 1970s "secular" existentialism. 
Having said all this, it remains a provocative and eminently watchable film; 
and it remains true that the kinds of issues it presents are the stuff of religions (inner 
turmoil, self-questioning, personal identity, relation to others/an other). I stand by 
the particular, theological conversation I conducted with the film in Explorations 
in Theology and Film. My further reflections are, however, in part theologically-
informed and result from my own theological development, from the growth in my 
understanding of the complex richness of the diverse, particular theological 
tradition within which I stand (Christian-Protestant-Methodist, deeply informed by 
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Calvinism, Pietism, Lutheranism, Anglicanism, Feminism, Liberal theology of the 
19th and 20th centuries, and Post-Liberalism). The new reflections I offer take 
nothing from the particular, theological reading I have already offered of the film. 
They merely complement the ideology-critical/cultural studies insight just offered, 
and enrich the resulting content of the dialogue which specifically Christian 
theology can have with the film.  
My earlier reading of Shirley Valentine as a "woman of spirit", being 
inspired to a form of prayer through her process of identity-loss and self-
questioning in middle-age needs to be supplemented by some kind of critique from 
the perspective of ecclesiology. By this I do not mean that I should have 
recommended to her that she should simply have "gone to church".9 I mean that the 
form and place of corporate human living needs to be addressed much more in any 
adequate Christian reading of the workings of "spirit". The film does in part address 
the issue of Shirley Valentine's loss of identity in relation to a lost network of 
friends. But it leaves unsaid why she is so stable, sensible and "together" in the first 
place, to enable her to address the self-questioning when it arises. 
Now this "postscript" to my earlier piece could be read as wriggling when 
caught in a tight spot or anticipating a potential weakness in the chapter; maybe. 
But in the context of this present discussion I would want it rather to be viewed as 
an example of the way that discussion of film actually works theologically. There 
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can always be multiple readings and re-readings of films. Those potential readings 
are not limitless. Constraints are imposed by the form and subject-matter of the 
films themselves (textual determinacy). But what readers themselves bring is 
always diverse and changes, diverse and changing even in the life of an individual 
interpreter. If such readings are not, however, to be merely seen as a manifestation 
of individual whim, then much more attention to the interpretative communities out 
of which an interpreter approaches a film is called for. As a Christian theologian, I 
am consciously working within Christian traditions. I believe this will continue to 
be fruitful. I am not bound to everything that Christianity stands for (how could I 
be?). Nor am I resistant to whatever readings might be offered from other religious 
traditions to the films with which I work. Nor, again, do I suppose that any 
particular film might simply affirm all that I already believe, or have nothing to 
contribute to the development of my own Christian value-system. That such a 
critical dialog can occur at all is what "theology by negotiation" is about.10 But I 
must make clear the hermeneutical traditions I am working with in undertaking my 
task of interpretation. 
Now at this point, the location of an interpretative task surely becomes 
significant. Distinctions can rightly be drawn between academic and church 
locations of interpretations. Within academic locations, university/college and 
seminary may be distinguished. Geography is far from unimportant, given, for 
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example, the different relations between state, church and academy in the USA and 
the UK (different even in the different component countries which make up the 
latter). Even acknowledging the complexities created by geography, however, does 
not alter the fact that diverse hermeneutical traditions with a range of interests are 
at work in the interpretative task. If we are handling - in religious studies - 
theological claims in any form, then we are dabbling in theology. If we are not 
commending or promoting any particular theology, then we have to be clear on 
what (hermeneutical and ethical) basis we are not doing that. If we end up implying 
that any theology is inevitable (and will therefore "do"), then we have problems. 
Precisely because John Lyden is not doing that, then it is vital to highlight the 
theological/ideological basis upon which the "ideology" so prevalent in popular 
films (which is to be critiqued) and the "myths" constituting "the religion of popular 
film" (which are to be commended) rest. For the answer to that question constitutes 
the theological/hermeneutical tradition within which he is actually working. In 
short, even in religious studies, theology has to be done in some form, both in the 
interests of the fruitfulness of the task, and in order to disclose the hermeneutical 
drivers which enable us to see what's on the screen. 
My second example is The Shawshank Redemption. In stark contrast to 
Shirley Valentine, this is a film which invites a "religious" reading of some kind. 
"Redemption" is hardly a word to pull in the crowds at the local multiplex (though 
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Tim Robbins and Morgan Freeman evidently managed it). But the very appearance 
of the term indicates the kinds of issues that will be touched on in the film's 
narrative and even, I would argue, alludes to the hermeneutical traditions out of 
which those issues might be best clarified and even understood. Redemption is 
clearly a weighty theological word. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that 
because redemption forges an obvious link to theological discussion, therefore a 
"religious" reading of the film - in a general sense - must result. Again, only 
interpreters using particular theologies can conduct a conversation with the film. 
So where are we to look? It would be right to say, as scholars of religion must, that 
we are free to look anywhere to enable us to be informed about the nature of the 
"redemption" dealt with in the film, both across the religions of the world, and 
outside of religion. And we must, of course, also allow for the possibility that the 
term was originally used as no more than a metaphor.11 In this case, however, 
though it may be said that all religion is to some extent in the salvation business, 
the use of the term "redemption" narrows down the range of discussion-partners 
somewhat.12 Adopting a simple reference-book strategy, I find that references to 
"redemption" in John Hinnells' Dictionary of Religions direct me to articles on 
"Gospel", "Icon", "Jesus Christ", "Judaism", and "Mari."13 Even allowing for some 
Judaeo-Christian bias in the dictionary cited (for which I am claiming no particular 
evidence), these cross-references suggest that Jewish and Christian interactions 
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with the subject-matter of The Shawshank Redemption are likely to be the most 
productive. 
But having established this, what then? Again questions of the location of 
the interpreter become important. Who is an interpretation for? What is it meant to 
do? I may, in other words, be interpreting the film for Christians, in a Christian 
seminary, wanting to re-interpret the Christian doctrine of redemption (and may 
even wish to commend a particular form of it) for Christian ministers.14 Or I may 
be in a liberal arts college, wanting to examine a range of possible readings of the 
film in the light of religious traditions pertaining to "redemption". But, in the latter 
case, what would I be doing it for? It is clear that it would be inappropriate simply 
to play off any particular Jewish reading of the film against any Christian reading 
(or vice versa). But to deny that there is ideological critique involved the religious 
study of film is to deny what actually goes on, as John Lyden's paper clearly shows. 
The question is: at what point, and in what way, does ideology-critique take shape 
in relation to the particularity of religion, rather than with regard to "religion" per 
se, given that religion only operates in particular forms? 
At this stage, the comparison between theology and film discussions and 
progress in the field of inter-faith dialogue is again instructive. Inter-faith dialog 
has developed to a point when it is accepted that participants in a particular tradition 
do not simply speak about their traditions, whilst listening to others speak of theirs, 
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but also speak for them.15 There is a challenge here for "religious interpreters of 
film" to follow this track: we cannot shirk the public and ethical responsibility to 
interact creatively with, and to evaluate, the religious ideas and images which films 
present (implicitly or explicitly), but we cannot do this without greater attention to 
the particular conversations which are required of us in the process. Furthermore, 
we cannot do this without recognizing the diverse nature of the hermeneutical 
traditions (not only religious) within which we as interpreters actually stand, the 
locations we find ourselves in when we undertake our interpretations, and the 
diverse interests we serve. We need to be clearer than ever about what it is that we 
commend (and why) even if there will be so many times when we shall also imply, 
or state, "we simply do not know". All this, I suggest, would of necessity be entailed 
in considering, in a teaching context, what to do with The Shawshank Redemption. 
Where has this exploration left us? First, we are indebted to John Lyden for 
spelling out the approaches he sees at work in the use of film in religious studies. 
His work prompted me to make links with my own activity in theology and film, 
and to examine our respective undertakings in a constructive fashion. Second, it is 
clear that there are useful conversations to be had between theologians and scholars 
of religion about how film is to be interpreted in their respective disciplines. These 
conversations will need to more fully self-conscious than has often been the case, 
and must highlight the crucial significance of differences in institutional location. 
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But they must not be bound by constraints which are themselves ideological (and 
with which interpreters of film implicitly or explicitly collude). Such conversations 
must acknowledge that theology is necessary within religious studies, and that some 
understanding of the role of religion/religions is essential for theologians, lest they 
become blind to the particularity of their own universal claims. Third, it is clear that 
all interpreters of film have to be more upfront about the baggage they necessarily 
bring to their interpretative task. This is not so that all interpretation can become 
thinly-veiled autobiography. Precisely the opposite is the case. It is so that the 
inevitably autobiographical element inherent in the interpretative task can do its 
work, in the interests of doing justice to a film as text, and to the hermeneutical 
traditions represented within the conflict of interpretations. We shall not then be 
ideology-free. But we may at least make some progress in determining - together - 
which ideologies are the least bad, and why. 
1 Clive Marsh and Gaye Ortiz eds. Explorations in Theology and Film (Oxford and Malden: 
Blackwell 1997). Ch. 2 is entitled "Film and Theologies of Culture" (pp21-34); here esp. pp24-28. 
2 Even if religious believers are always in practice likely to view their theology/ies as "more than 
mere ideology", on an Althusserian reading of "ideology", theological discourse is simply a 
particular type of ideological discourse. 
3 Ideology-critique is, in other words, inevitable (as John Lyden acknowledges). My question 
essentially revolves around the extent to which theology is a component part of that task (and 
responsibility) to be ideology-critical. What, for instance, are the theological components (be they 
Christian, Jewish or whatever) which contribute to the perceived need constantly to challenge 
hegemonic structures and discourses? 
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4 It is perhaps worth stating here that in response to a question I posed when the article was 
delivered as a paper at the AAR Meeting in San Francisco in November 1997, John Lyden stated 
firmly his opposition to the notion of any "monomyth". The question then presents itself as to 
which myths are acceptable and which not, and on what grounds. 
5 Even accepting that "religion" may need to be defined very broadly by a scholar of religion 
(including e.g. sporting endeavour, therapies, aesthetic activity) I think this point is still defensible 
in both senses of the term: can be defended and is worth defending. 
6 The question of institutional location - and of what is possible in different locations, in different 
places - is clearly also pertinent here, and will be touched on below. 
7 Explorations in Theology and Film pp193-205, in which I discuss Shirley Valentine in relation to 
the Christian doctrine of the (holy) spirit. 
8 ibid. p203; citing P. Strick's review of the film in Monthly Film Bulletin 56, 1989, p346 
9 This may actually have been useful, but in fairness to her, I'd have wanted to know a bit about 
some of the local forms of "church" before commending one to her! 
10 I introduce this term in Explorations in Theology and Film p33 
11 A number of further observations are necessary here, however: 1) metaphors are rarely ever 
"mere metaphors"; 2) an author's particular use would not wholly determine, and thus control, all 
subsequent interpretations of the term; therefore, 3) even if the author - in this case Stephen King - 
had intended no religious reference, he does not have the last word; an author cannot use an 
evidently theological term and then expect the theological references to be disregarded. 
12 And the location of the story - in the USA - itself suggests that a Jewish or Christian reading 
might be expected, though here we are faced with that intriguing conundrum that one of the 
world's most Christian countries is at the same time one of the most multi-faith. 
13 The Penguin Dictionary of Religion ed. John R. Hinnells (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1984), 
pp135, 159, 173, 176, 201. There is no article on "redemption" as such. The article on "salvation" 
(p281) draws attention to the Judaeo-Christian origins of the technical use of the term, though 
notes its general applicability as "rescue or release from a state which is evil or imperfect". 
14 To which one common response, of course, is: why do this? Why not just use the Bible? To 
venture into such territory - though important, and sadly necessary - would be to open a different 
discussion again. 
15 See e.g. Arvind Sharma ed. Our Religions (HarperSanFrancisco 1993) and the profound piece 
on "Dialogue" by John Cobb Jr. in Death or Dialogue? From the Age of Monologue to the Age of 
Dialogue L. Swidler et al. (London SCM/ Philadelphia TPI 1990), pp1-18, esp. section V. 
"Dialogue, persuasion and conversion" (pp8-9). 
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